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THE EFFECT OF SECTION 12 OF THE 
CANADA EVIDENCE ACT UPON AN 
ACCUSED*
Eric L. Teed, Q .C.f
The purpose of this paper is to show that the provisions 
o f s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act1 adversely affect an ac­
cused and can hinder his fair trial.
S. 12(1) of the Canada Evidence Act reads as follows:
A witness may be questioned as to whether he has been 
convicted of any offence, and upon being so questioned, 
if he either denies the fact or refuses to answer, the 
opposite party may prove such conviction.
In  order to understand why this section was enacted, it is 
necessary to trace its historical development. Prior to 1843 any 
person who had been a convicted criminal was an incompetent 
witness. In that year an act was passed in England providing 
that no person offered as a witness shall be excluded by reason 
of “incapacity from crime”.
This same provision is now contained in s. 3 of the Canada 
Evidence Act which reads:
A person is not incompetent to give evidence by reason 
of interest or crime.
The fact that a witness has been convicted of crime now affects 
only his credibility, but not his competence.
At common law a witness may always be questioned, or 
evidence may always be given, concerning his general character. 
This would be done by calling other witnesses to prove a gen­
eral reputation of bad character.
However, there is a general rule that a witness cannot be 
contradicted on irrelevant matters. The statute makes former 
criminals competent witnesses. The fact of the previous con­
viction is irrelevant to the issue. A witness, therefore, could be 
questioned as to a previous conviction, presumably as affecting 
credibility, or character, but, if he denied the conviction, his 
denial was conclusive. At common law his denial could not be 
contradicted, unless it was relevant to the issue, as where it 
showed design, or the like.2
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Once character is an issue, questions pointing to credibility 
can be asked, even if they suggest that the accused person has 
been convicted of, or charged with, another offence. At com­
mon law, however, the prosecution was bound by the answer 
of the accused.
To get around the difficulty of a witness with a previous 
criminal record being asked questions concerning previous con­
victions as a test of credibility, and the examiner being con­
fined to the denial by the witness since previous convictions 
were irrelevant to the issue, the English Parliament enacted the 
Criminal Procedure Act of 1865.
This was followed in Canada shortly after Confederation 
by s. 65 of the Dominion Procedure in Criminal Cases Act,3 
which reads as follows:
A witness may be questioned as to whether he has been 
convicted of any felony or misdemeanor, and upon be­
ing so questioned, if he either denies the fact or refuses 
to answer, the opposite party may prove such convic­
tion, and a certificate as provided in section tw enty-six, 
shall, upon proof of the identity of the witness as such 
convict, be sufficient evidence of his conviction, with­
out proof of the signature or the official character of 
the person appearing to have signed the certificate.
The provision was continued in the Revised Statutes4 with a 
slight modification.
It must be remembered that this was enacted before Cana­
da had a Criminal Code. When a Criminal Code5 was enacted 
in Canada in 1892, the same provision was included as s. 695. 
In 1906 the section was taken from the Criminal Code and 
placed in substantially the same form in the Evidence Act,6 
where it has remained ever since.
S. 12, as it reads, deals only with witnesses, and would ap­
pear to be harmless insofar as a defendant in a criminal case is 
concerned. It must be remembered that, when the section was 
first enacted, a defendant could not testify on his own behalf. 
The section clearly could not have contemplated an accused 
being questioned as to whether he had been convicted of past 
crimes.
The first decision on the effect of the English equivalent 
of our s. 12 was Ward v. Sinfield.1 The Court ruled a party to 
a cause who gives evidence in support of the cause may be
3 S.C. 1869, e. 29
4 R.S.C. 1886, c. 174, s. 231.
5 S.C. 1892, e. 29.
6 R.S.C. 1906, c. 145, s. 12.
7 (1880), 49 L .J.Q .B . 696.
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cross-examined as to whether he has ever been convicted of an 
offence. If he denies or refuses to answer, the opposite party 
may prove the conviction although the fact of conviction be 
.altogether irrelevant to the matter in issue of the cause.
Lopes J . stated:8
It seems to me that the construction we are now putting 
on the enactm ent is a reasonable one,, lor if a witness 
who has been convicted denies such a m atter, which 
must be so clearly within his own knowledge, as well 
as obviously untrue, the jury ought to know it, in order 
they may understand the kind of witness they have 
before them.
Now the effect of s. 12 which applied only to witnesses, 
and not the accused who was still incompetent to give evidence, 
may have been very useful in challenging the validity of testi­
mony. It was not until 1893 that the problem the subject of 
this paper came into being. This was the result of a new pro­
vision allowing an accused person to testify on his own behalf 
-enacted in the Canada Evidence Act.9
This section read as follows:
Every person charged with an offence, and the wife or 
husband, as the case may be, of the person so charged, 
shall be a competent witness . . .
It is the combined application of s. 4 providing that a de­
fendant may testify and s. 12 with respect to past convictions 
which has produced the unfortunate situation that an accused 
who testifies may be examined on previous convictions.
In England s. 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, 
which is still in force, has similar wording, but has important 
and material exceptions. S. 1 of this Act reads as follows:
Every person charged with an offence, and the wife or 
husband, as the case may be, of the person so charged, 
shall be a competent witness for the defence at every  
stage of the proceedings, whether the person so charged  
is charged solely or jointly with any other person. P ro ­
vided as follows: —
(a) A person so charged shall not be called as a w it­
ness in pursuance of this Act except upon his own ap­
plication:
(b) The failure of any person charged with an offence, 
or of the wife or husband, as the case may be, of the 
person so charged, to give evidence shall not be made 
the subject of any comment by the prosecution:
(c) The wife or husband of the person charged shall 
not, save as in this Act mentioned, be called as a w it­
8  Ibid., at p. 697.
9  S.C. 1893, c. 31, s. 4.
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ness in pursuance of the Act except upon the applica­
tion of the person so charged:
(d ) Nothing in this Act shall make a husband com ­
pellable to disclose any communication made to him by 
his wife during the marriage, or a wife compellable to  
disclose any communication made to her by her husband 
during the m arriage:
(e) A person charged and being a witness in pursu­
ance of this Act may be asked any question in cross- 
examination notwithstanding that it would tend to  
crim inate him as to the offence charged:
(f) A person charged and called as a witness in pur­
suance of this Act shall not be asked, and if asked shall 
not be required to answer, any question tending to show 
that he has committed or been convicted of or been 
charged with any offence other than that wherewith he 
is then charged, or is of bad character unless —
(i) the proof that he has committed or been 
convicted of such other offence is admissible evi­
dence to show that he is guilty of the offence 
wherewith he is then charged; or
(ii) he has personally or by his advocate asked 
questions of the witnesses for the prosecution with  
a view to establish his own good character, or has 
given evidence of his good character, or the nature  
or conduct of the defence is such as to involve 
imputations on the character of the prosecutor or 
the witnesses for the prosecution; or
(iii) he has given evidence against any other per­
son charged with the same offence:
(g) Every person called as a witness in pursuance of 
this Act shall, unless otherwise ordered by the court, 
give his evidence from the witness box or other place 
from which the other witnesses give their evidence:
(h ) Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of 
section eighteen of the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, or 
any right of the person charged to make a statem ent 
without being sworn.
The leading case on the effect of s. 12 indicates that the 
present state of the law was brought about by accident, and 
not by design. This is Rex v. D ’Aoust.10
In this case it was argued that, when the Canada Evidence 
Act of 1893 was enacted making the accused a competent witness, 
it was not intended to allow him to be examined on previous 
convictions. The accused, being on trial, was on a different 
footing from an ordinary witness. He would be seriously preju­
diced by proof of a previous conviction, while an ordinary 
witness is not so prejudiced.
The Court ruled, however, that the provisions of the Can­
ada Evidence Act made no distinction between the accused and
10 (1902), 3 O.L.R. 653 (C.A.).
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any other witness so far as liability to cross-examination on 
previous convictions was concerned. The Court noted that there 
was a fundamental distinction between the Canadian Act and 
the Imperial Evidence Act of 1893.
Rex v. D ’Aoust was adopted and followed in Rex v. Mulvi- 
hilln and in Rex v. Miller.12 In the latter case the Court, in ap­
plying Rex v. D ’Aoust, stated:13
. . .  in Canada there is not the same limitation upon the 
right of cross-exam ination as in England.
The extreme application of s. 12 was reached in Rex v. 
Daltonu  where the Court, purporting to follow Rex v. D ’Aoust 
and Rex v. Miller, stated that s. 12 permitted cross-examination 
respecting charges on which the accused had been acquitted.
However, this was properly limited in Koufis v. The King15 
where Taschereau J. stated:
The authority given to the Crown is to cross-exam ine  
the accused on previous convictions, but this s. 12 can­
not be interpreted as meaning that the accused m ay be 
cross-exam ined on offences which he is suspected of 
having committed but for which he has not been con­
victed.
It is clear that the position of a defendant in England is 
much better protected than the position of a defendant in Can­
ada. It is also obvious that s. 12 was originally enacted in rela­
tion to the credibility or character of a witness other than an 
accused. It is further clear that Canadian law has endeavoured 
to adhere to the position that the character of the accused may 
not be considered or dealt with unless he himself first raises 
the question. However, Canadian law has not protected an ac­
cused from the position that character is also a matter which 
affects credibility, and that previous prosecutions may be used 
to show bad character as a reasonable ground for lessening 
credibility.
The object of cross-examination is set out in Rex v. Mulvi- 
liillie where Phipson is cited as follows:
In cross-cxam ination a witness may be asked not only 
as to facts in issue, or directly relevant thereto, but all 
questions tending [inter alia] . . .  (3 ) to impeach his 
credit by attacking his character antecedents, associa­
tions, and mode of life . . .
11 (1914), 18 D.L.R. 189, 22 C.C.C. 354, 19 B.C.R. 197 (C.A.).
12 [1940] 4 D.L.R. 763, 74 C.C.C. 270, 55 B.C.R. 204 (C.A.).
13 Ibid., at p. 764 D.L.R., p. 271 C.C.C., p. 207 B.C.R.
14 [1935] 3 D.L.R. 773, 64 C.C.C. 140, 9 M.P.R. 451 (N.S. Sup. 
Ct. in banco).
15 11941] S.C.R. 481, at p. 490, [1941] 3 D.L.R. 657, at p. 664. 
76 C.C.C. 161, at pp. 169-170.
16 (1914), 18 D.L.R. 189, at p. 195, 22 C.C.C. 354, at p. 361. I?'
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It is submitted that unless a previous conviction has to do 
with a charge of perjury, it does not directly affect credibility, 
but only indicates bad character which indirectly affects credi­
bility. Therefore, we find the Canadian law in the position of 
not allowing the accused who is a witness to be attacked direct­
ly on character, but allowing him to be attacked indirectly on 
character by being questioned on previous convictions under 
the pretense that such questions relate solely to credibility and 
not character.
This is clearly a ridiculous and disturbing situation. Most 
lawyers would agree that questions as to previous convictions 
relate firstly to character and secondly to credibility.
It is interesting to learn what the courts have thought of 
the practical effect that s. 12 has on the defendant. This is 
illustrated by the statement of Bray J. in The King v. Ellis17 
referring to the effect of a question as to previous convictions:
. . .  in most cases the mischief is done by the asking of 
the question. The jury naturally assumes that no such 
question would be put unless there was foundation for 
it, and the more objection is made to it by the prison­
er’s counsel, the stronger to their minds becomes that 
assumption.
This feeling was affirmed in conversations between the 
writer and the trial judges of New Brunswick. One judge 
stated that any jury, being human, is affected and influenced 
by a defendant being asked questions concerning his previous 
convictions. The alleged offence may have no relation or bear­
ing on the crime in question, but it does have a material effect 
on the jury.
When an accused is asked if he was convicted of a crime 
and he truthfully answers “yes”, the result is not the view “he’s 
honest by admitting his fault”, rather it is the view “he’s a 
scoundrel, being a criminal, and not to be believed”.
In Rex v. Roche18 the Court, recognizing the practicalities 
of life, stated:
The likely effect if not the only effect, upon the jury  
men of this line of cross-exam ination, . . . would be 
that the accused was a person who was very apt to com­
mit the crime with which he was charged . . .
The courts are recognizing the unfairness of this effect of 
cross-examination of the accused on previous convictions and
B.C.R. 197, at p. 206 (C.A.).
17 [1910] 2 K.B. 746 (C.C.A.), at pp. 763-764.
18 (194Í-), 95 C.C.C. 270 (N.S. Sup. Ct.), at p. 286, quoting 
Koufis v. The K ing, [1941] S.C.R. 481, at pp. 486-487, [1941]
3 D.L.R. 657, at pp. 661-662, 76 C.C.C. 161, at pp. 166-167.
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are attempting to institute rules to ameliorate the problem. In 
Regina v. Gaich or Gajic19 the Court ruled that:
When accused becomes a witness on his own behalf he 
may be cross-exam ined as to whether he has been con­
victed of any offence, the inquiry being relevant as ef­
fecting the credibility of the accused.
The Court continued with directions as to the proper use of 
such evidence:20
Such admissions of the accused’s previous record are 
admissible only as going to his credit and the trial 
Judge is under a duty to make clear to the jury, or in a 
trial without a jury to charge himself accordingly as to 
the limited effect of such evidence.
In Rex v. Fushtor21 MacKenzie J. A., delivering the judg­
ment of the Court, noted:
It is also to be rem arked that though the learned Judge- 
prcperly told the jury that they should consider what 
value evidence of these convictions should have in con­
nection with the prisoner’s credibility, he did not direct 
them that they should not legally take it into account 
in determining whether he was guilty of the offence for 
which he was being tried. We think he should have 
cautioned them in this respect lest they might have as­
sumed that it could be accepted as evidence that he was 
a bad man and possessed of a propensity or disposition 
to commit any kind of crime.
Clearly the courts are struggling to ameliorate the harsh­
ness of the existing situation by imposing special rules to be 
applied when an accused is cross-examined on his previous 
record.
The general rule is character should not be in issue, but 
that guilt must be decided on the factual evidence. But we 
now have the practical position that, if the accused does take 
the stand, character is immediately brought into issue under the 
guise of credibility.
Bearing in mind the weaknesses and frailties of juries, and 
even of trial judges, it is recommended that, to avoid any sug­
gestion of improper trial, the Canada Evidence Act be amend­
ed to adopt the position of the English Act. S. 12 is without 
objection as it stands. However, s. 4, allowing an accused to 
give testimony, should provide those safeguards which are con­
tained in the Criminal Procedure Act of England. This would 
restore the defendant in a criminal matter to the full protection 
of the principle that his character must not be brought into 
issue unless he raises the matter. It would prevent cross-ex­
amination on previous convictions unless the accused himself 
brings character into issue.
19 (1956), 116 C.C.C. 34 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 39, quoting headnote 
to R ex  v. Dalton, [1935] 3 D.L.R. 773, 64 C.C.C. 140 (N.S. Sup. 
Ct. in banco).
20 Ibid., at p. 39.
21 (194(0, 85 C.C.C. 283 (Sask. C.A.), at p. 286.
